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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IN CALIFORNIA: A
TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
Scott J. Burnham*
I. INTRODUCTION
California law has been flexible in permitting resolution of dis-
putes by accord and satisfaction.' This body of law has been accessi-
ble to both lawyers and lay persons, who are accustomed to using. it
on a regular basis. However, a statute enacted with little attention
by the 1987 legislature, Civil Code section 1526,2 dramatically
changes this tradition. The statute displaces this body of law and
threatens to disrupt this commonly used method of dispute resolu-
tion. This article places the statute in the context of the existing law
of accord and satisfaction, analyzes its content, and suggests steps
attorneys should take to comply with it.
II. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
A. Accord and Satisfaction
Lawyers are frequently asked to resolve questions involving ac-
cord and satisfaction, usually when a client has received a "condi-
tional check."' A client says something like this: "I got a check from
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1. The statutory basis for this body of law is found in CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1521-1526
(West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The law in California is discussed in 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Compro-
mise, Settlement, and Release §§ 20-36, 37-42 (1974).
General sources include Burnham, A Primer on Accord and Satisfaction, 47 MONT. L.
REV. 1 (1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 278-282 (1981); 6 A. CORBIN, A
COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW §§ 1268-1302
(1962); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.23-.25 (1982); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 4-10 to -12, 5-16 (3d ed. 1987); Annotation, Satisfaction of Debt by
Payment of Less than Amount Claimed to be Due, 35 P.O.F.2d 735 (1983).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1990).
3. Other terms used to describe a situation in which the check is offered upon a condi-
tion and the payee understands that cashing the check constitutes assent to the condition in-
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one of my customers for 80% of the amount due. On the back of the
check, right over where I would endorse it, it says 'accepted in full
satisfaction of my obligation.' If I cash the check, can I still go after
him for the rest of the money?"
The parties' agreement to accept partial performance in full
satisfaction of an unliquidated or disputed debt is known as an ac-
cord." Because an accord is a contract, the agreement must satisfy the
traditional criteria of contract formation: consideration, offer, and
acceptance.
To determine whether partial payment discharges an obligation,
the first step is to determine whether the debt is either unliquidated
or disputed, for the element of consideration is satisfied only in that
event. For example, Matthew 18:23-24 tells the parable of the
master who discharges the large debt of his servant. The servant,
failing to learn the lesson of forgiveness, imprisons his own small
debtor. When the master learns of this, he revokes the discharge and
imprisons the servant.
This parable reflects not only good religion but good common
law. The discharge was not effective because there was no considera-
tion for it. If a creditor accepts $800 to discharge an undisputed
$1000 debt, the creditor may then turn around and sue for the $200
balance. Since the debtor owed the $1000 in any event, there is no
consideration for the creditor's promise to forego $200.' This is an
application of the common law "pre-existing duty rule."6
Because the problem is consideration, the debtor may simply
offer a new or additional performance in return for the discharge.
For example, the creditor could accept $800 and a peppercorn in
satisfaction of the $1000 debt. Or the creditor could accept $800 on
June 30 to discharge a $1000 debt due July 1. Since the law does
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, it is the parties' busi-
ness if they decide to exchange a peppercorn or performance a day in
elude "full payment check," "check in full settlement," and "conditioned check." See Flambeau
Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Inf. Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 98 n.3, 341 N.W.2d 655, 658 n.3
(1984).
4. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1521 (West 1982) provides:
Accord defined. An accord is an agreement to accept, in extinction of an obligation, something
different from or less than that to which the person agreeing to accept is entitled.
5. American courts were quick to adopt this view after it was decided in the House of
L.rds in Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884). This rule has been subject to criticism. See,
e.g., Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 647 (1982): "The
time has come to drop the legal-duty rule and substitute in its place a careful review of bar-
gains involving the performance of a preexisting contractual duty, to determine whether they
are unconscionable."
6. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.21.
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advance for $200.
None of these devices is necessary to compromise unliquidated
or disputed debts, however, for consideration is present in the deter-
mination of the debt and the extinguishment of the claim.' Similarly,
if a buyer refuses to pay a $1000 bill for goods sold and delivered on
grounds that the goods are defective, the seller's acceptance of $800
in full satisfaction discharges the obligation. In consideration of the
buyer giving up the claim, the seller has foregone $200.
An interesting twist occurs if the buyer admits to owing $800
but disputes the other $200. The seller accepts $800 in full satisfac-
tion and then claims that there was no consideration for discharge of
the disputed portion. In Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.,' the
California Supreme Court held that the seller's acceptance of the un-
disputed portion in full satisfaction settles the entire claim.9 While
acknowledging that. authority is divided on the point, the court rea-
soned that "[t]he consideration for the tender and acceptance of each
check in a less amount was the termination of dispute, and the ex-
tinction of [the] obligation . . . ."'0 In Potter, the court refused to
apply a narrow view of consideration and correctly characterized the
transaction as one intended to bring about a settlement."
The element of consideration is satisfied only if the debt is truly
unliquidated or disputed. Liquidated means agreed upon by the par-
ties or a court. 2 According to the doctrine of account stated, a debt
may also become liquidated when it goes unchallenged by the debtor
for a period of time. 8 This doctrine, which has been well articulated
7. This, however, is the body of law displaced by CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526 (West Supp.
1990). See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
8. 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
9. Id. at 602, 234 P.2d at 21.
10. Id., 234 P.2d at 22 (quoting Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 113, 118, 93
P.2d 175, 178 (1939)).
11. Similarly, in Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or. 425, 429, 571 P.2d 503, 505 (1977),
the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
It would be too technical a use of the doctrine of consideration to release a well-
counseled debtor who tenders a nominal amount beyond his admitted debt but
to trap one less sophisticated who is induced to pay the undisputed amount in
return for his creditor's illusory promise to forgive the rest.
12. See Blumer v. Madden, 128 Cal. App. 22, 25-26, 16 P.2d 319, 321 (1932).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 282 (1981) provides:
Account stated.
(1) An account stated is a manifestation of assent by debtor and creditor to a
stated sum as an accurate computation of an amount due the creditor. A party's
retention without objection for an unreasonably long time of a statement of ac-
count rendered by the other party is a manifestation of assent.
(2) The account stated does not itself discharge any duty but is an admission by
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in California, can be useful in determining whether a debt is liqui-
dated. 4 For example, an attorney is retained to perform services at
an hourly rate of $100. The debt at that time is unliquidated, as the
amount has not been agreed upon. The attorney later renders a bill
for $1000. The client protests the amount of the bill and the attorney
accepts $800 in full satisfaction. The attorney has no claim for the
balance, for the obligation never became liquidated. In consideration
of the attorney liquidating the debt at $800, the client has satisfied it.
If the bill had been resubmitted for several months and had gone
unpaid, then under the doctrine of account stated it would tend to
become liquidated at $1000 and a lesser payment would not dis-
charge it.
For a debt to be disputed, there must be a good faith defense to
payment. The debtor's desire to bargain a bill down is not enough.
For example, in Berger v. Lane," the court held that plaintiff's ac-
ceptance of a conditional check did not create an accord and satisfac-
tion when "the attitude of defendant appears to be that of a person
endeavoring to release himself from the full consequences of a bind-
ing contract." 6 Therefore, if a creditor accepts $800 to settle a
$1000 debt, the creditor could nevertheless recover the balance if the
creditor demonstrates the absence of a good faith dispute. 7
In addition to consideration, the parties' accord must satisfy the
elements of offer and acceptance. Courts favor settlement, but only
when the settlement is knowingly and freely made. 8 Courts often
state that the offer to enter into an accord may be stated on the check
itself or on an accompanying memorandum.' 9 In spite of the fact
that a statement on the check itself is unlikely to bring the offer to
the attention of the debtor, California courts have held such notice to
be sufficient. In Newsom v. Woollacott,2 0 plaintiff architect received
each party of the facts asserted and a promise by the debtor to pay According to
its terms.
14. See, e.g., Gleason v. Klamer, 103 Cal. App. 3d 782, 163 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1980);
Zinn v. Fred R. Bright Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 597, 76 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1969).
15. 190 Cal. 443, 213 P. 45 (1923). See also Kelly v. David D. Bohannon Org., 119
Cal. App. 2d 787, 260 P.2d 646 (1953).
16. Berger, 190 Cal. at 449, 213 P. at 48.
17. The creditor would not be able to recover the balance, however, if the debtor had
complied with the steps necessary to settle a liquidated and undisputed debt under CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1524 (West 1982). See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
18. Whepley Oil Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 94, 44 P.2d 670 (1935).
19. "This sometimes is shown by the express words used in the body of the check or by
an accompanying receipt stating that the amount sent is in full of all demands." Berger, 190
Cal. at 452, 213 P. at 49.
20. 5 Cal. App. 722, 91 P. 347 (1907).
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and cashed defendant's check for part payment which contained the
memorandum "In full for 9th and Grand Ave. fees."'" The jury,
instructed to determine whether the check evidenced an accord and
satisfaction, found that it did not. Plaintiff received judgment for the
balance of his claim. The court of appeal reversed, holding that un-
less he controverted it, plaintiff was presumed to have knowledge of
and be bound by the terms of the instrument.22
Similarly, in Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.,2" the commu-
nication was on a voucher attached to the draft. The voucher stated:
"Payee will please detach and keep this statement. Payment of sight
draft attached hereto is accepted in full settlement of account stated
below, and endorsement thereof will constitute payee's receipt to the
Pacific Coast Lumber Company of California."2 The jury found
that plaintiff's acceptance of the draft did not constitute an accord
and satisfaction. The supreme court reversed, holding that insuffi-
cient evidence in the record supported this finding:
The record conclusively shows from plaintiff's own testimony
that he knowingly accepted the remittances from defendants on
the terms definitely stated on the accompanying vouchers in un-
equivocal expression of their intent as "full settlement," for he
"figured that a bird in the hand was better than nothing."25
A dissent adopted the opinion of the court of appeal that the issue
was properly a question of fact.26
As a practical matter, the view that a memorandum on a check
or a voucher is sufficient to bring the offer to the attention of the
creditor could be extremely prejudicial to a large volume creditor
which cannot reasonably be expected to give careful scrutiny to its
checks. The creditor could, however, be expected to examine those
checks that arrived with an accompanying letter explaining the dis-
pute that the check is offered to resolve.2"
In Teledyne Mid-America Corp. v. HOH Corp.,"A plaintiff
treated a conditional check received by its accounting department as
a payment on account. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law,
21. Id. at 724, 91 P. at 347.
22. Id. at 725-26, 91 P. at 348.
23. 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
24. Id. at 596, 234 P.2d at 18.
25. Id. at 601, 234 P.2d at 21.
26. Id. at 603, 234 P.2d at 22 (Carter, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Arroll, 66 Misc. 2d 816, 322 N.Y.S.2d 420
(1971).
28. 486 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1973).
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affirmed the trial court's conclusion that acceptance of the check con-
stituted an accord and satisfaction. The court reasoned that the cash-
ing of the check by the accounting department did not by itself con-
stitute an accord and satisfaction. Rather, an accord was formed
when, after defendant brought the facts to the attention of the princi-
pals of the plaintiff corporation, plaintiff did not return the check in
spite of the fact that it now had unmistakable knowledge of the
terms of defendant's offer. 9
As with any other offer, the offeree must either accept the offer
on its terms or reject it. A creditor who strikes off the restrictive
endorsement or holds the check for an unreasonable amount of time
may be found to have accepted the settlement offer.3" In Sheldon
Builders, Inc. v. Trojan Towers,"1 the court held that a creditor who
wishes to avoid the presumption that part payment has been ac-
cepted must return the check. On the other hand, in Besco Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Carole, Inc.,2 the court held that the parties had not
entered an accord when the creditor kept the check but gave written
notice that "we cannot accept the check as presented." 33
As with any contract, whether the parties have entered an ac-
cord depends on their intent, objectively expressed. In Whepley Oil
Co. v. Associated Oil Co.,"' plaintiff accepted conditional checks that
were computed erroneously by defendant. The court properly held
that there was no accord because plaintiff did not know the amounts
tendered were less than the full amount due. 5 However, when it
learned of the mistake, plaintiff continued to accept the checks while
the parties attempted to resolve the dispute. The court held that
there was no accord with respect to these checks either, stating that:
The acceptance by [plaintiff] of amounts smaller than it was
demanding during the time when negotiations for arbitration
were being carried on is not indicative of an accord. It may not
be argued successfully that [plaintiff] who, during all of this pe-
riod, was insisting that it was entitled to larger royalty pay-
ments, evidenced an intention to abandon its claim by its accept-
ance of smaller amounts."
29. Id. at 993-95.
30. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 598, 234 P.2d 16, 18 (1951).
31. 255 Cal. App. 2d 781, 63 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1967).
32. 274 Cal. App. 2d 42, 78 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1969).
33. Id. at 43, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (emphasis omitted).
34. 6 Cal. App. 2d 94, 44 P.2d 670 (1935).
35. Id. at 112, 44 P.2d at 678.
36. Id. at 113, 44 P.2d at 678.
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While the court in Whepley Oil Co. focused on the intent of the
plaintiff, it should have focused on the defendant. The fact that the
defendant continued to demonstrate willingness to resolve the prob-
lem after the plaintiff accepted the checks indicates that it did not
intend an accord under the circumstances.3"
An accord hovers like Tinker Bell until it has been fully per-
formed. The full performance is called satisfaction.38 The formation
of the accord and its satisfaction discharges the original obligation.
But if the accord is not fully performed, the accord agreement is
breached. The injured party may then sue either on the accord or on
the original obligation, which is revived by the breach. 9 Any partial
payment is treated as a payment on account. For example, in the
case of the attorney's unliquidated $1000 bill, assume the parties en-
tered into an accord calling for discharge of the obligation by the
payment of $800 in thirty days. If the client pays only $600 in thirty
days, the attorney may treat the accord as breached, revive the $1000
claim and sue for the $400 balance due.
B. Substituted Contract
In the situation of the attorney's bill for $1000, it would be
unwise for the attorney to bill the client for $800 when the accord is
reached. If the client breaches the accord, the attorney wants to re-
vive the original $1000 claim. But the $800 bill makes it appear that
the consideration for the $200 reduction was the client's agreement
to liquidate the claim at $800. In that case, the attorney has made a
valid contract, limiting the recovery to $800. This difficulty arises
from the failure of the parties to distinguish between an accord and
satisfaction and a substituted contract.4
37. See Work v. Associated Almond Growers, 102 Cal. App. 232, 236, 282 P. 965, 966-
67 (1929):
It is an essential element of an accord and satisfaction by tender of a check, that
the tender is subject to the condition that the acceptance of the check is satisfac-
tion in full. This condition is not shown by the mere fact that the debtor accom-
panies the check with an account showing a balance equal to the amount of the
check, and it is disproved where the giving and acceptance of the check is fol-
lowed by such conduct of both parties as clearly shows that they did not con-
sider the check a final settlement of the debt.
38. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1523 (West 1982) provides:
Satisfactioni, What. Acceptance, by the creditor, of the consideration of an accord extinguishes
the obligation, and is called satisfaction.
39. Holton v. Noble, 83 Cal. 7, 23 P. 58 (1890).
40. A substituted contract is often called a novation in California. The common practice
is to use novation when the new obligation is undertaken by a third party and substituted
contract when it is undertaken by the same parties. 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 1, § 1293, at
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In a substituted contract, the consideration for the discharge of
the original obligation is the promise of performance, while in an
accord, it is performance itself. For example, A has a $10,000 tort
claim against B. After negotiation, A agrees to release B in exchange
for B's promise of $5000 in thirty days. B does not pay the $5000. A,
thinking an accord has been breached, revives the tort. action. B
raises the affirmative defense of substituted contract. B may prevail if
the court determines that the parties intended a substituted contract
rather than an accord. If B prevails, A is limited to suit on the $5000
substituted contract. Recall that a contract arises from an exchange
of promises, whether the parties perform or not. In the example, the
parties have formed a contract even though A has received no money.
There has been offer and acceptance and A has received good consid-
eration for the release: B's promise to pay the liquidated amount of
$5000.
As with any other contract, determining the parties' intent is a
question of interpretation. 4 In the absence of a clearly stated inten-
tion, however, the California courts have presumed that the parties
intended an accord. In every reported case in which the issue has
been raised, the California courts have never found that a creditor
entered into a substituted contract when the creditor accepted a
promise to pay in exchange for discharge.42 This rule holds even
when the creditor obtains a promissory note, which is by definition a
promise to pay, in return for the discharge. The courts have consist-
190. In the Restatement, novation is defined exclusively as a substituted *contract that includes
a third party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 280 (1981). The California Civil
Code, however, defines novation to include a new contract between the same parties as well:
Modes of novation. Novation is made:
1. By the substitution of a new obligation between the same parties, with intent
to extinguish the old obligation;
2. By the substitution of a new debtor in place of the old one, with intent to
release the latter; or,
3. By the substitution of a new creditor in place of the old one, with intent to
transfer the rights of the latter to the former.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1531 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
41. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Gaither, 162 Cal. App. 2d 607, 621, 329 P.2d 22, 31 (1958),
in which the court stated:
In the instant case there is no evidence that [plaintiff] agreed to accept Gran-
Wood's promise to complete three of the five structures as satisfaction of the
pre-existing debts. Certainly, the presumption is against any such conclusion.
The most reasonable and sensible interpretation of the correspondence is that
the creditors were willing to accept performance of the agreement to finish three
of the five houses in satisfaction of their existing claims, but extinguishment of
those claims was conditional upon performance of the second promise.
42. In addition to Gardiner, see Silvers v. Grossman, 183 Cal. 696, 192 P. 534 (1920).
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ently held that when a debtor gives a creditor a promissory note, the
debt is not extinguished unless the note was expressly received in
payment of the debt."
Parties who intend an accord, with the agreement conditional
on performance, should make that intention clear to avoid litigating
the issue. The prudent attorney can easily protect against this prob-
lem. When sending the bill for services, the attorney should bill for
$1000, with a notation on the bill that it may be satisfied by the
payment of $800 within thirty days. In settling the claim, the order
of dismissal should provide that if defendant does not pay as prom-
ised, plaintiff may enter judgment for the full amount of the claim
less payments made. If the promise is for a substantial future per-
formance, the payment should be secured.
III. THE CREDITOR'S DILEMMA
On the one hand, the law of accord and satisfaction allows peo-
ple to resolve their disputes expeditiously. Simply by negotiating a
conditional check, parties can enter into a binding settlement without
the need to draft complex instruments, consult an attorney, or go to
court. The procedure is available to anyone from the most unsophis-
ticated debtor to the giant corporation.
On the other hand, this body of law has been described by one
authority as "an exquisite form of commercial torture."" Reasoning
that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, a creditor may feel
compelled to accept the partial payment, even when the creditor be-
lieves the dispute is not bona fide. Of course, the creditor who spurns
the part payment reserves the right to pursue the full amount of the
debt. Or, if the debtor made part payment without raising a bona
fide defense to full payment, the creditor may accept the part pay-
ment and pursue the balance.4 As a practical matter, however, the
creditor knows that the economic cost of collecting either the. full
amount or the balance will rarely justify the effort."'
43. Welch v. Allington, 23 Cal. 322, 323 (1863) ("The law will not presume such an
agreement, and it must be proved by the party relying on it."); Dellapiazza v. Foley, 112 Cal.
380, 44 P. 727 (1896); Gardner v. Shreve, 89 Cal. App. 2d 804, 202 P.2d 322 (1949).
44. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, §§ 13-21, at 544 (2d ed. 1980). A student note goes even further, suggesting
that "[t]he positions of the parties to an accord and satisfaction are frequently the reverse of
the classic debtor-creditor relationship, with the creditor practically at the mercy of the so-
called debtor." Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon of the Overreach-
ing Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99, 100 (1948).
45. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
46. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Courts have been mindful of these competing considerations.
While encouraging dispute resolution, the courts have scrutinized the
agreements carefully to ensure they have been entered freely and
knowingly. If one party induced the agreement unscrupulously or
raised no bona fide defense to payment, courts have been very will-
ing to set aside the agreement. An analysis of 54 reported appellate
cases on point reveals that in 44 of the 54 cases, the court held that
there was no accord and satisfaction. The reasons include no com-
municated intent (13 cases), no bona fide dispute (11), no contract
formed because of fraud, illegality, or insanity (5), and no agreement
on basic terms (5).
The courts are clearly policing accord and satisfaction. Any leg-
islative change in the mechanism of accord and satisfaction, there-
fore, should be evaluated by whether it, like the common law
scheme, furthers these three objectives:
1. The expediting function. That is, does it encourage informal
dispute resolution?
2. The discriminating function. That is, does it police agree-
ments to ensure that debtors are not avoiding honest debts?
3. The communicating function. That is, does it ensure that
both debtors and creditors are aware of the agreement they are
making?
IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Common law accord and satisfaction has been affected by the
enactment of Commercial Code section 1207"' and Civil Code sec-
tion 1526.48 These statutes will be examined to determine whether
they further the objectives of common law accord and satisfaction. It
will be seen that Commercial Code section 1207, as interpreted by
the courts, does not impede accord and satisfaction but that Civil
Code section 1526 threatens to undermine its foundations.
A. Uniform Commercial Code Section 1207
In 1963, California enacted the Uniform Commercial Code.49
Commercial Code section 1207 provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or
47. CAL. COM. CODE § 1207 (West 1964 & Supp. 1990).
48. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1990).
49. CAL. COM. CODE. §§ 1101-9508 (West 1964 & Supp. 1990).
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promises performance or assents to performance in a manner
demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby
prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without
prejudice," "under protest" or the like are sufficient. °
Creditors soon began to use this section in an attempt to circumvent
the common law of accord and satisfaction.5"
This use of the statute is illustrated by the case of Connecticut
Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc."2 Defendant debtor sent plaintiff
creditor a check for part payment with the notation "This check rep-
resents payment in full for all obligations owed by . . . [defendant]
. . "58 Relying on the language of section 1207 which would per-
mit it to reserve its rights, plaintiff wrote on the check, "Payment
accepted without prejudice and subject to final determination of
amount due.""4 After endorsing and depositing the check, plaintiff
sued for the balance. Defendant moved for summary judgment, rely-
ing on the rule stated in Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co.55 that
the offeree of a conditional check must either reject the offer or ac-
cept it in accordance with its terms. 6
The court of appeal acknowledged that the states were sharply
divided on the issue of whether section 1207 operated to prevent an
accord and satisfaction. Reconciling Potter with the Commercial
Code, the court cited with favor a Washington case which held that
the Code did not supersede the law of contracts except where ex-
pressly provided. 57 Citing the doctrine that when faced with conflict-
ing authority it may adopt the better rule, the court held that the
better rule is the rule of Potter, which encourages accord and
satisfaction."8
50. Id. § 1207.
51. The many cases on this topic are collected at Annotation, Application of UCC § 1-
207 to Avoid Discharge of Disputed Claim Upon Qualified Acceptance of Check Tendered as
Payment in Full, 37 A.L.R. 4TH 358 (1985). Law review citations may be found in Flambeau
Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Inf. Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, 102 n.4, 341 N.W.2d 655, 659 n.4
(1984). See also McLaughlin, Section 1-207 and "Full Payment": Finding Concord Amidst
Discord, 7 NAT'L L.J. 20 (1984); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 13-24 (3d ed. 1988).
52. 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1982).
53. Id. at 57, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
54. Id.
55. 37 Cal. 2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951).
56. Connecticut Printers, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 57, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (citing Potter,
37 Cal. 2d at 597, 234 P.2d at 18).
57. Id. at 60, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39 (citing State Dept. of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales
Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 610 P.2d 390 (1980)).
58. Id. at 60-61, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (citing 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
§ 692(3), at 4609 (2d ed. 1971)).
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Although the court in Connecticut Printers did not clearly ar-
ticulate the objectives of accord and satisfaction, the decision is con-
sistent with them. Creditors' use of the statute does not serve the
expediting function, for it discourages dispute resolution. When of-
fering an accord, a debtor does not know whether the dispute will be
resolved by the part payment if the creditor may invoke the statute.
It could be argued that, under the contract rule that the offeror is the
master of the offer, the debtor could tender the offer conditional on
the offeree's not invoking section 1207."9 That level of sophistication,
however, is beyond the reach of the ordinary debtor. Nor does use of
the statute serve the discriminating function, for it allows creditors to
take advantage of both honest and dishonest offers.
Although section 1207 makes sense in other contexts, when ap-
plied to accord and satisfaction it fails to serve the communicating
function. For example, assume that the parties first agree to an ac-
cord and the debtor later performs by payment. The creditor could
not invoke section 1207 when the debtor pays, for the statute con-
templates reservation of rights in the face of defective performance. 0
There is no defective performance when the debtor performs pursu-
ant to the terms of an accord that was clearly communicated. As-
sume, alternatively, that the debtor tenders a conditional check. The
debtor is offering simultaneously to enter an accord and to perform
it. By invoking the statute in these circumstances, the creditor must
be characterizing as defective the performance under the original
59. For example, in a letter to the National Law Journal, December 24, 1984, a Chi-
cago attorney recommended that the debtor use this language:
Payment in full. Upon cashing this check the creditor agrees to fully discharge
the debtor from liability arising out of (specified obligation) and further agrees
not to reserve any rights with respect to that obligation and waives his right to
use Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The return or destruction
of this check shall mean that the creditor has rejected these conditions, but the
act of cashing it shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence that he has accepted
them.
60. Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1 to CAL. COM. CODE §.1207 (West 1964 &
Supp. 1990) states:
This section provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the
lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dispute, by adopting the
mercantile device of going ahead with delivery, acceptance, or payment "without
prejudice," "under protest," "under reserve," "with reservation of all our
rights," and the like.
(emphasis added). For example, in the famous "chicken" case, buyer, who was shipped stew-
ing chickens when it expected fryers, sent seller a cable stating that it was accepting the ship-
ment without prejudice to its rights to recover damages and to receive frying chickens in future
deliveries. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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agreement. But this characterization misstates the transaction. The
debtor is not defectively performing the original transaction; the
debtor is offering to enter into a new transaction. The creditor
should not be permitted to reject a communicated offer while ac-
cepting its benefits on the basis of a knowingly wrongful
characterization.
The result in Connecticut Printers, therefore, appears correct.
The support given accord and satisfaction by the court in Connecti-
cut Printers, has, however, been taken away by the legislature's en-
actment of Civil Code section 1526.
B. Civil Code Section 1526
1. The Statute
The more recent impediment to the application of the principles
of accord and satisfaction is Civil Code section 1526,"1 enacted in
1987. On its face, the statute repudiates the common law of accord
and satisfaction, replacing it with a statutory scheme that will prove
a pitfall to unwary debtors. The section provides:
Section 1526. Check or draft tendered in full discharge of claim;
acceptance; protest; composition or extension agreement between
debtor and creditors; release of claim
(a) Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated and a check or
draft is tendered by the debtor in settlement thereof in full dis-
charge of the claim, and the words "payment in full" or other
words of similar meaning are notated on the check or draft, the
acceptance of the check or draft does not constitute an accord
and satisfaction if the creditor protests against accepting the
tender in full payment by striking out or otherwise deleting that
notation or if the acceptance of the check or draft was inadver-
tent or without knowledge of the notation.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the acceptance of a check
or draft constitutes an accord and satisfaction if a check or draft
is tendered pursuant to a composition or extension agreement
between a debtor and its creditors, and pursuant to that compo-
sition or extension agreement, all creditors of the same class are
accorded similar treatment, and the creditor receives the check
or draft with knowledge of the restriction.
A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowl-
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1990). The effective date of the statute is
January 1, 1988. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 9600 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
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edge of the restriction if a creditor either:
(1) Has, previous to the receipt of the check or draft, exe-
cuted a written consent to the composition or extension
agreement.
(2) Has been given, not less than 15 days nor more than 90
days prior to receipt of the check or draft, notice, in writing,
that a check or draft will be tendered with a restrictive endorse-
ment and that acceptance and cashing of the check or draft will
constitute an accord and satisfaction.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the acceptance of a check
or draft by a creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction
when the check or draft is issued pursuant to or in conjunction
with a release of a claim.
(d) For the purposes of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), mail-
ing the notice by first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to
the address shown for the creditor on the debtor's books or such
other address as the creditor may designate in writing consti-
tutes notice. 62
2. A Critique of the Statute
a. Subdivision (a)
Subdivision (a) restricts application of the statute to instances
"[w]here a claim is disputed or unliquidated." The word claim is not
used artfully, for, as discussed below, claim is used in a different
context in subdivision (c). In subdivision (a), claim probably refers
broadly to a right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment,
for common law accord and satisfaction arises in this broad context.
At common law, any honest dispute, such as a tort claim, a debt, or
an implied contract, could give rise to an accord and satisfaction.
The statute correctly limits its scope to those claims that are "dis-
puted or unliquidated," for, as discussed above, common law accord
and satisfaction is concerned only with such claims."
Subdivision (a) goes on to address the instance where a condi-
tional check is offered to discharge the debt "and the words 'payment
in full' or other words of similar meaning are notated on the check
or draft." It is not clear whether the legislature intended the statute
62. Id. Not the least of the problems with the statute is its awkward construction. In the
Appendix to this article, the statute is rewritten in enumerated form.
63. Liquidated and undisputed obligations are addressed in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1524
(West 1982). See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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to apply in all cases in which a conditional check is presented or only
in those cases where the restrictive notation appears on the check
itself. A literal interpretation might hold that the statute does not
apply in cases where an oral statement, separate communication, or
accompanying letter, rather than the check itself, communicates the
offer to the creditor.
It would, however, make little sense to apply one body of law
where a notation appears on a check and another where it does not.
The common law rule, repeatedly pronounced by the California
courts, is that the offer to enter into an accord may be made either
on the check or in a separate communication.64 The notation on the
check is therefore customary but has no legal significance.65
On the other hand, if application of the statute were restricted
to those instances in which the only knowledge the creditor has of
the offer is the notation on the check, then the statute would fill an
existing gap in the development of accord and satisfaction in Califor-
nia. It would serve the communicating function by encouraging of-
ferors clearly to communicate the offer independently of the check.66
The next portion of subdivision (a) represents the most critical
change in the law of accord and satisfaction. At common law, a cred-
itor who received a conditional check had two choices: accept the
offer according to its terms or reject it.67 According to the statute, the
creditor may reject the offer to enter into an accord while accepting
the conditional check as a payment on account. The creditor may do
this in three alternative ways: (1) by striking out or otherwise delet-
ing the notation, (2) by accepting the check inadvertently, or (3) by
accepting it without knowledge of the notation.
The first alternative, striking out or otherwise deleting the nota-
tion, makes little sense, because, as discussed above, the offer to enter
into an accord does not require a notation. Assuming there is a nota-
tion, a number of factual questions arise that will invite litigation.
What does it mean to "otherwise delete" the notation? Would lan-
guage borrowed from Commercial Code section 1207, such as "ac-
cepted with prejudice" suffice to show the creditor's intention to ne-
gate the notation? If so, the legislature will have changed the result
64. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Keppard v. International Harvester Co., 581 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1978),
holding that, under California law, even though plaintiff had no written or oral warning of the
effect of the check, he should have known from the circumstances that he was entering into an
accord and satisfaction.
66. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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in Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., which held that
such language was not effective.68 If the legislature intended to
change the result in that case, it could have addressed that issue with
greater precision. A mundane problem that will arise from applica-
tion of this section is that because many banks no longer return
checks to the customer, debtors will lack evidence of the creditor's
attempted preservation of the claim. Debtors who learn from credi-
tors that their obligations have not been discharged will then have to
retrieve and evaluate the check and endorsement.
The creditor's invocation of the second alternative, accepting the
check inadvertently, may render unnecessary the preservation of any
evidence. Under this alternative, the creditor need only claim, after
the fact, that it would not have deposited the check had it noticed the
endorsement. A creditor might claim, for example, that it uses a
mechanical device for endorsement and does not examine each check
individually. This provision will probably also invite litigation, for
the debtor who has fallen prey to it may litigate the issue of whether
the creditor acted inadvertently.
The final alternative for the creditor to prevent an accord and
satisfaction is to accept the check "without knowledge of the nota-
tion." Again, a number of factual questions arise. What does it mean
to lack knowledge? Is there knowledge if a separate conversation or
memorandum alerts the creditor to the conditional check? Is there
knowledge if the creditor endorses the check below the restriction?
What if that endorsement is mechanical? If the legislature had de-
fined knowledge, these questions would be resolved. It appears that
there may be a statutory definition of knowledge, but that will re-
quire examination of subdivision (b), where the definition appears.
b. Subdivision (b)
Subdivision (b) creates an exception to the scheme of subdivi-
sion (a). The creditor's acceptance of a conditional check constitutes
an accord and satisfaction if the check is tendered pursuant to a com-
position agreement and: (1) all creditors of the same class are treated
similarly, and (2) the creditor receives the check "with knowledge of
the restriction." At first blush, this exception seems unimportant, for
it will generally be used by sophisticated parties who knowingly
enter the agreement. The provision seems out of place in the statute,
however, for the statute is concerned with disputed or unliquidated
68. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30
1990 ACCORD & SATISFACTION IN CALIFORNIA 489
debts, while a composition agreement generally involves acknowl-
edged obligations that the debtor is unable to pay.
Subdivision (b) applies when the creditor receives the check
"with knowledge of the restriction." This phrase raises two ques-
tions. In subdivision (a), the phrase "knowledge of the notation"
(emphasis added) is used, while in subdivision (b) the phrase' be-
comes "knowledge of the restriction" (emphasis added). Did the leg-
islature intend a different meaning when it used different lan-
guage?69 Knowledge of the restriction could be broader' than
knowledge of the notation in the sense that knowledge of an offer to
enter into an accord could arise from sources other than the notation
itself. The intent was more likely that the words mean the same
thing: knowledge that the check is offered to discharge the obligation.
If that is the case, then the language of subdivision (a) will be inter-
preted broadly to apply to all offers, whether a notation appears on
the check or not.
The second question arising from the phrase "knowledge of the
restriction" is more crucial to interpretation of the entire statute.
Subdivision (b) goes on to define knowledge. The question then be-
comes whether the definition of knowledge in subdivision (b) also
defines knowledge for purposes of subdivision (a). Let us examine
the definition in subdivision (b):
A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowledge of
the restriction if a creditor either:
(1) Has, previous to the receipt of the check or draft, executed a
written consent to the composition or extension agreement.
(2) Has been given, not less than 15 days nor more than 90
days prior to receipt of the check or draft, notice, in writing,
that a check or draft will be tendered with a restrictive endorse-
ment and that acceptance and cashing of the check or draft will
constitute an accord and satisfaction. 0
The prefatory language of this provision contains the phrase
"knowledge of the restriction," which reflects the earlier language of
subdivision (b). This provision states that the creditor presumptively
has knowledge in two instances. The first, subdivision (b)(1), clearly
applies to the composition agreement described earlier in subdivision
(b). The second, subdivision (b)(2), provides for a notice scheme by
69. The "Golden Rule" of drafting is that the drafter "always expresses the same idea
in the same way and always expresses different ideas differently." R. DICKERSON, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING § 2.3.1 (2d ed. 1986).
70. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1526(b) (West Supp. 1990).
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which the debtor can ensure that the creditor has knowledge. Does
this notice scheme apply only to subdivision (b) or does it apply to
subdivision (a)?
Although subdivision (b)(2) uses the phrase "restrictive en-
dorsement" used earlier in subdivision (b), it uses the key clause "ac-
ceptance and cashing of the check or draft will constitute an accord
and satisfaction" if the notice scheme is complied with. This clause is
parallel in structure to the clause in subdivision (a) which provides
that "acceptance of the check or draft does not constitute an accord
and satisfaction" if the creditor invokes one of the three alternatives,
the third of which is accepting it without knowledge. The repetition
of this language makes it appear that the definition of knowledge in
subdivision (b)(2) also defines knowledge for purposes of subdivision
(a).
In Armco, Inc. v. Glenfed Financial Corp.,1 defendant sent
plaintiff a letter calculating its obligation and enclosing a check for
that amount. The court was faced with the issue of whether, under
California law, defendant clearly communicated to plaintiff that ac-
ceptance of the check constituted an accord and satisfaction. The
court correctly concluded, citing Potter and other authority, that
merely accompanying the check with an accounting is not enough to
constitute clear notice. 72 The court went on to state:
By way of analogy, although it appears the statute was not in
existence at the time the Aircraft Agreement was signed, Cali-
fornia recently enacted the following provision as an addition to
its Civil Code:
.Check or Draft Tendered in Full Discharge of Claim; Accept-
ance; Protest; Composition or Extension Agreement Between
Debtor and Creditors; Release of Claim
(a) Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated and a check
or draft is tendered by the debtor in settlement thereof in full
discharge of the claim, and the words "payment in full" or
other words of similar meaning are notated on the check or
draft, the acceptance of the check or draft does not constitute an
accord and satisfaction if the creditor protests against accepting
the tender in full payment by striking out or otherwise deleting
that notation or if the acceptance of the check or draft was inad-
vertent or without knowledge of the notation.
71. 720 F. Supp. 1129 (D.N.J. 1989). This is the only case to date that cites California
Civil Code section 1526.
72. Armco, 720 F. Supp. at 1154-55.
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A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowl-
edge by [sic] the restriction if a creditor either:
(1) Has, previous to the receipt of the check or draft, exe-
cuted a written consent to the composition or extension
agreement.
(2) Has been given, not less than 15 days nor more than 90
days prior to receipt of the check or draft, notice, in writing,
that a check or draft will be tendered with a restrictive endorse-
ment and that acceptance and cashing of the check or draft will
constitute an accord and satisfaction. [citation omitted]
Glenfed's argument that it is entitled to summary judgment
on the deferred income issue because of the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction is denied. The factual record (which includes a
lack of clear notice to Armco), as it currently exists, does not
support entry of summary judgment."8
The court in Armco read the statute as it must reasonably be
construed, viewing the definition of knowledge in subdivision (b)(2)
as defining knowledge for purposes of subdivision (a). The ellipsis in
the court's citation of the statute indicates that it read the definition
as applying to subdivision (a). Perhaps more significantly, the court
cited the statute on the issue of whether the offer to enter into an
accord was clearly communicated. In this context, the court saw the
statute as serving the communicating function.
The effect of this construction is that the statute provides a no-
tice scheme by which the debtor can conclusively demonstrate that
the creditor accepted the conditional check with knowledge and is
bound by the terms of the accord. In other words, while subdivision
(a) provides the creditor with the means to prevent formation of an
accord, subdivision (b) provides the debtor with a way to make the
accord effective. This interpretation finds support in the legislative
history of section 1526. In its initial draft, the statute contained only
the language in subdivision (a) that permits the creditor to prevent
an accord and satisfaction by striking or deleting the notation.74 As
later amended, the exception for a composition agreement was
added, including the definition of knowledge.75 In the final amend-
ment, the language "or if the acceptance of the check or draft was
73. Id. at 1155 (ellipsis in original).
74. SB 1684, added by Stat. 1987, ch. 1268, § 1 (1987) (current version at CAL. CiV.
CODE § 1526 (West Supp. 1990)).
75. Id. (amended in assembly July 9, 1987).
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inadvertent or without knowledge of the notation" was added to sub-
division (a)."0 When the legislature inserted the word knowledge in
subdivision (a) that it had previously defined in subdivision (b), it
may be assumed that it intended the same definition to apply to both
subdivisions.
If this interpretation is correct, then subdivision (b)(2) provides
a scheme by which the debtor may effectively bring about an accord
and satisfaction. That provision states that the creditor is conclu-
sively presumed to have knowledge when the creditor has been given
written notice, not less than fifteen nor more than ninety days prior
to receipt of the check, stating that a check will be tendered with a
restrictive endorsement and that cashing of the check will constitute
an accord and satisfaction. By negative implication, if the debtor
gives the creditor less notice, as by enclosing a letter with the check,
the notice would not constitute knowledge for purposes of subdivi-
sion (a). Without "knowledge" of the offer, the creditor would be
free to accept the check as a payment on account and recover the
balance.
Because of the ambiguous wording of the statute, however,
there is no guarantee that compliance with the notice requirement
will be effective to establish an accord and satisfaction. Recall that
subdivision (a) provides the creditor with three ways to prevent an
accord and satisfaction. If the debtor takes the correct steps, the cred-
itor clearly has "knowledge." Nor could the creditor claim the check
was accepted inadvertently. However, the creditor could in theory
employ the third method, striking out the restrictive notation. A
court should resolve this ambiguity by enforcing an accord and satis-
faction when the debtor has given the creditor sufficient knowledge
of the offer."' In this manner, the communicating function would be
served.
c. Subdivision (c)
Turning to subdivision (c), that part of the statute creates an
exception to subdivision (a). Subdivision (c) provides that acceptance
of the check creates an effective accord and satisfaction when the
check is presented in conjunction with release of a claim. This choice
of words is unartful at best, for subdivision (a) begins by invoking
the statute "where a claim is disputed or unliquidated." If the word
76. Id. (amended in assembly Sept. 2, 1987). In an earlier amendment, August 25,
1987, the substance of the present subdivision (c) was added.
77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1526(a) (West Supp. 1990).
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claim means the same thing in subdivision (c) as in subdivision (a),
then (c) would totally vitiate (a). Presumably, then the meaning of
claim in subdivision (c) is narrower than its meaning in subdivision
(a). In its narrower meaning, claim probably means tort claims as
opposed to claims based on debts and other contractual obligations.
If this interpretation of subdivision (c) is correct, then if a
debtor sent a conditional check offering $800 to settle a disputed
$1000 obligation arising from contract, the creditor could render the
attempted accord ineffective by employing the alternatives outlined
in subdivision 1526 (a). But if an alleged tortfeasor sent a condi-
tional check offering $800 to settle an obligation arising from a tort
claim, the transaction would fall outside the statute and would be
governed by the common law. Under the common law, acceptance of
the check would result in an effective accord.7 8 The exception seems
written for the insurance industry, which could make settlement of-
fers to claimants without concern that the claimant could invoke the
statute.
d. Conclusion
In conclusion, the statute serves neither the communicating, ex-
pediting, nor discriminating functions of common law accord and
satisfaction. If interpreted as enacting a notice scheme to bring about
an effective accord, the statute would serve the communicating func-
tion of accord and satisfaction. It would ensure that debtors and
creditors are aware of the agreement they are making. The commu-
nicating function would be served, however, at the expense of the
expediting and discriminating functions. While sophisticated parties
will be aware of the statute, unsophisticated parties will not become
aware of it until after they have sent a conditional check that would
have created an accord under the common law. This result will also
follow if compliance with the notice scheme of subdivision (b) is not
effective for purposes of subdivision (a).
Unwary debtors will find that their attempted resolution of a
dispute has invited litigation. Trapped by the statute and lacking the
resources to learn correct compliance, these parties will be discour-
aged from employing this dispute resolution mechanism. Nor does
the statute serve the discriminating function, for it permits creditors
to take advantage of both honest and dishonest offers. 9
78. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Again, the creditor's alternatives would
be to accept the offer as presented or reject it.
79. Similarly, the application of Commercial Code section 1207 rejected by the Califor-
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If the statute is designed to serve the discriminating function by
removing from the offeree the pressure to settle, the exception in
subdivision (c) is inconsistent with that objective. Just as an unscru-
pulous debtor can abuse the agreement process by raising a claim in
bad faith and proposing a settlement that the creditor accepts be-
cause the economic costs of refusing are too high, so may an insur-
ance company take advantage of a tort claimant's need for a quick
settlement."
3. Conplying with the Statute
Attorneys for debtors should structure their accords to be effec-
tive in light of the statute. The only way for a debtor to ensure an
effective accord is to secure the creditor's consent in advance of
tender of the conditional check. 8 ' To avoid any later claim that the
debt was undisputed, the debtor should obtain the creditor's agree-
ment to accept the partial payment in the form of a signed writing.82
In the case of a composition agreement, subdivision (b)(1) re-
quires the written consent of the creditor while subdivision (b)(2)
requires that the same offer be made to all creditors of the same
class. Attorneys for debtors seeking composition agreements should
also take the following steps:
1. Send written notice to the creditor.88
2. State that "a check will be tendered with a restrictive en-
dorsement and that acceptance and cashing of the check or draft
will constitute an accord and satisfaction."'" To avoid any mis-
understanding, track that statutory language expressly.
3. After sending the notice, wait at least 15 but not more than
90 days before sending the creditor the check.8 '
4. State in an enclosed writing and on the check itself, "this
check is tendered in accordance with my letter of [date]. Cash-
nia courts in Connecticut Printers did not serve this function. See supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text.
80. Cases setting aside releases are collected at Annotation, Avoidance of Release of
Personal Injury Claims on Ground of Fraud or Mistake as to the Extent or Nature of Inju-
ries, 71 A.L.R. 2D 82 (1960).
81. Of course, the agreement is subject to the traditional defenses to contract formation.
82. See the discussion of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1524 (West 1982) infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
83. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1526(b)(2) (West Supp. 1990). The debtor must follow the no-
tice requirements of id. § 1526(d).
84. Id. § 1526(b)(2).
85. Id.
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ing of the check will constitute an accord and satisfaction, dis-
charging the obligation." This step is not required by the stat-
ute, but it will ensure that the creditor understands that this
particular check is sent in accordance with the earlier notice.
In the expectation that a court will interpret the notice scheme
as satisfying the knowledge requirement of subdivision (a), the attor-
ney may wish to send a conditional check in compliance with that
scheme. In addition to the four steps outlined above, the attorney
should:
5. In the initial written notice, state facts that make clear that
the obligation is either disputed or unliquidated.88 The statute
applies only to disputed or unliquidated debts. If the debt is
liquidated and undisputed, follow the steps under Civil Code
section 1524.7
6. In the writing accompanying the check and on the check itself
write, "Striking out this endorsement is of no effect.""8
C. An Alternative Approach
Civil Code section 1526 reflects a concern that many debtors use
accord and satisfaction not to resolve good faith disputes, but to
chisel down honest debts.8 9 This concern is a legitimate one, which
has been addressed successfully by the courts.9 The reported cases
in this area, however, undoubtedly under-represent the frequency
with which creditors enter into suspect accords. Most creditors can-
not litigate the issue and capitulate to the settlement. The statute
goes too far the other way, however, making ineffective accords that
are offered in good faith. This seems unfair to unsophisticated debt-
ors, who are familiar with the common law but not the new statute.
Reform of accord and satisfaction should serve the discriminat-
ing function while not interfering with the expediting and communi-
cating functions. This reform could be accomplished by making dis-
honest accords more costly and thereby discouraging them. A court
could, for example, determine that a debtor who raises a defense in
86. Id. § 1526(a).
87. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
88. Inadvertent acLeptance and striking out of the endorsement are the other grounds a
creditor may use to prevent an accord and satisfaction under CAL. CIv. CODE § 1526(a) (West
Supp. 1990).
89. The sparse legislative history is of little use in determining the legislative intent.
Concern about dishonest debtors was expressed to the author by the bill's sponsor, Senator
Quentin Kopp.
90. See supra text following note 46.
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bad faith has committed a tort. In Seaman's Direct Buying Service,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,91 the California Supreme Court stated:
It has been held that a party to a contract may be subject to tort
liability, including punitive damages, if he coerces the other
party to pay more than is due under the contract terms through
the threat of a lawsuit, made "'without probable cause and
with no belief in the existence of the cause of action.' " There is
little difference, in principle, between a contracting party ob-
taining excess payment in such manner, and a contracting party
seeking to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by
adopting a "stonewall" position ("see you in court") without
probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a defense.
Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It of-
fends accepted notions of business ethics. Acceptance of tort
remedies in such a situation is not likely to intrude upon the
bargaining relationship or upset reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties. [citations omitted]
If the court approves of tort damages in the situation where one
party coerces the other to pay more than is due under the contract
terms through the threat of a lawsuit, it requires no great leap to
approve of tort damages where one party coerces the other to accept
less than is due under the contract terms.92 One distinction is that
the offeror of an accord does not threaten a suit but instead threatens
that if partial payment is not accepted, the offeree will have to bring
suit. As a practical matter, however, it is just as costly to prosecute
as to defend.93 Furthermore, the accord and satisfaction situation is
factually analogous to Seaman's, for in that case Standard Oil, the
party who allegedly acted in bad faith caused the other to bring suit.
Most importantly, the accord is an analogous situation because, like
coercing excess payment or adopting a stonewall position, coercing a
lesser payment offends business ethics.
Support for this proposition may be found in Mission Insur-
ance Group, Inc. v. Merco Construction Engineers, Inc." In Mis-
sion, plaintiff tendered defendant a conditional check to settle an ob-
91. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769-70, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984).
'92. The use of such coercion falls short of the legal requirement for duress. It is gener-
ally held that "economic duress" is not a defense where the obligation is disputed and the
offeree is "forced" to accept the offer because of its financial situation. See, e.g., Selmer Co. v.
Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.).
93. Voltaire is reported to have said, "Only twice in my life have I felt utterly ruined:
once when I lost a lawsuit and once when I won." Kosmin, The Small Claims Court Di-
lemma, 13 Hous. L. REv. 934, 935 (1976).
94. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 195 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
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ligation. Defendant, claiming the amount was erroneous, refused to
accept the check. The trial court granted plaintiff summary judg-
ment on its claim for a declaratory judgment. The court of appeal
reversed, holding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether
plaintiff paid the proper amount of money. The court held that "a
duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to the resolution of a
dispute over the total amount of money due under a contract." 95 It
may be noted that plaintiff was an insurance company, and the tort
of bad faith has been well established with respect to insurers.98
Nevertheless, the holding was not limited and may apply to any
debtor who uses accord and satisfaction to chisel a creditor.
It would be possible to address the problem without invoking
the doctrine of bad faith, which the California court seems reluctant
to expand.97 The heart of the problem is that a coerced creditor who
agrees to an accord offered in bad faith and then successfully sues to
have it set aside, can recover the balance due but is not made whole
because of the transaction costs incurred, particularly attorneys'
fees.98 Under the "American Rule," each side pays its own attorneys'
95. Id. at 1068, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
96. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
97. See,.e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988) (denying tort claim for breach of the implied covenant in employment con-
tracts); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116 (1988) (denying tort claim for breach of the implied covenant in insurance
settlements).
98. See the discussion of transaction costs in Burnham, Contract Damages in Montana
Part I: Expectancey Damages, 44 MONT. L. REV. 1, 47-49 (1983). Actual costs are not recov-
ered because statutes provide for minimal taxable costs and low interest rates, and, with some
exceptions, do not provide for attorneys' fees. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 685.010 (West
1987), § 1021 (West 1990).
One alternative is for the creditor to lower transaction costs by bringing the claim in small
claims court. Unlike some jurisdictions, California permits a business to appear as plaintiff in
a small claims case. The jurisdictional limit of these courts is S2000 and $2500 effective Janu-
ary 1, 1991. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 116-117.4, 904.3 (West Supp. 1990) and CAL.
CIv. & CRIrm. RULES 151-58, 532, 982.7, 1701-2, & 1725.
California Civil Code section 1525 encourages parties to use small claims courts to resolve
the disputed portions of debts. For example, seller bills buyer $10,000 for goods sold and
delivered. Buyer claims that because of defects in the goods, his obligation is to pay $9000.
Seller's suit for $10,000 would have to be filed in superior court. If the debtor paid $9000
without condition, then seller could pursue the $1000 claim in small claims court. If, however,
the debtor offers the $9000 on condition that the part payment discharges the entire obligation,
the creditor is free to refuse the offer and pursue the claim for the entire $10,000 in superior
court. In Mission, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1068, 195 Cal Rptr. at 786, the court interpreted the
section as expressing the policy that a party has a duty to pay the undisputed portion of its
obligations.
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fees, win or lose." Because the courts are reluctant to expand tradi-
tional contract damages, the legislature might respond to this situa-
tion within existing doctrine by allowing a prevailing creditor to re-
cover attorn s' fees.100  With the incentive of recuperating
transaction cots, creditors might pursue unscrupulous debtors.10 1
If the cost of dishonest accords were driven up, debtors would
be discouraged from proposing them to creditors. Because honest
debtors would not be discouraged, there would be no effect on the
expediting function. The communicating function would continue to
be monitored by the courts to ensure that only accords that were
knowingly entered into, from the point of view of both the debtor
and the creditor, Were enforced.
V. LIQUIDATED AND UNDISPUTED DEBTS: CIVIL CODE
SECTION 1524
As a practical matter, creditors may sometimes wish to dis-
charge debts that are both liquidated and undisputed in return for
part payment. The common law scheme of accord and satisfaction,
which has proved adequate to deal with unliquidated or disputed
debts, does not apply to liquidated and undisputed debts.102 The leg-
islature filled this gap in 1872 by enacting Civil Code section 1524,
which provides:
Part performance of an obligation, either before or after a
breach thereof, when expressly accepted by the creditor in writ-
ing, in satisfaction, or rendered in pursuance of an agreement in
writing for that purpose, though without any new consideration,
extinguishes the obligation.10 8
Like a numher of other California statutes, this one makes a
writing a substitute for consideration.1 ' The attorney for the debtor
seeking to discharge a liquidated and undisputed debt should care-
99. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 611 (1988).
100. See, e.g., Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Feesnot Tort Liabili-
tythe Remedy for "Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419 (1987). In Foley, this approach was
analyzed and rejected by the supreme court, which suggested it might more appropriately be
considered by the legislature. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
101. Analogy may be made to the many statutes that permit recovery of attorneys' fees
when the litigation serves the general public. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West
1980).
102. California Civil Code section 1526(a) expressly applies only to disputed or unliqui-
dated debts. See supra text accompanying note 62.
103. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1524 (West 1982).
104. See Smith, Exceptions to the Consideration Requirement in California, 12 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 377 (1961).
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fully track the statute to determine whether all the elements are
satisfied:
1. Is the debt liquidated and undisputed? This element is essen-
tial, for the stftute applies only in the situation where consider-
ation is an obstacle.10 5
2. Is there an agreement to accept part performance? Common
law standards of contract formation, analogous to those used to
determine whether parties have entered into an accord, 06 are
useful in making this determination.
3. Is the agreement in a writing, expressly accepted? Note that
the writing, like a memorandum to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, 7 need be accepted only by the party against whom
enforcement is sought, here the creditor.
4. Did the debtor fully perform under the agreement? The stat-
ute makes clear that performance and not merely the promise of
performance is necessary to extinguish the original obligation.'0
If the debtor fails to satisfy any of these elements, then the creditor
may treat any payment made as a payment on account.
While the role of the statute is clear from the historical perspec-
tive, many cases and commentators have misunderstood it. Its pur-
pose was concisely stated in Schwartz v. California Claim Ser-
vice,'09 which also made clear that judgments may be compromised
under the statute:
Section 1524, Civil Code, does away with a rule which has long
been regarded by the courts as supported by scarcely more than
a superstition, and it gives recognition and validity to business
practices that are of common occurrence. The satisfaction of
judgments for less than their face value is of everyday occur-
rence, and sirtce every such settlement represents an agreement
mutually satisfactory to the parties and fraught with some bene-
fit to each, it should not be the policy of the law to discourage
such sensible arrangements under which a creditor can satisfy a
105. B. & W. Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal. App. 164 (1913). For an example of
misapplication of the statute, see Kelly v. David D. Bohannon Org., 119 Cal. App. 2d 787,
791-92, 260 P.2d 646, 649-50 (1953), in which the court cites California Civil Code section
1524 in support of the proposition that "[ain accord and satisfaction must be predicated upon a
bona fide dispute, a real dispute."
106. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 2201(1) (West 1964 & Supp. 1990).
108. Therefore the agreement could never be a substituted contract or novation. See
supra text accompanying note 40.
109. 52 Cal. App. 2d 47, 125 P.2d 883 (1942).
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judgment for what he thinks it is worth and a debtor can settle
it for what he can afford to pay. 1
The statute was further discussed in Petroleum Collections,
Inc. v. Sulser.'1 ' While the court did an excellent job of clarifying
correct application of the statute, it neglected discussion of one ele-
ment, that the writing must be "expressly accepted by the creditor in
writing." The court left the impression that the creditor's mere en-
dorsement is a sufficient writing. This interpretation, however,
debilitates the communicating function of the statute. One purpose of
the requirement of a writing is to ensure that the creditor has knowl-
edge of the offer. If the creditor's endorsement manifests such a writ-
ing, a debtor could trick the creditor into accepting part payment of
an undisputed debt merely by placing a condition on the back of the
check. The artifice would often go unnoticed, particularly by those
high-volume creditors who do not scrutinize each check. At least one
other jurisdiction with a similar statute has properly held that the
creditor's endorsement of a conditional check is not an express ac-
ceptance as contemplated by the statute.'
1 2
Misapplication of the statute may be seen in Blumer v. Mad-
den." 8 Plaintiff obtained judgment against defendant for $465.06
plus interest and costs. Plaintiff agreed in writing to accept payment
of $483.34 in monthly installments of $50 in full satisfaction of the
obligation. Defendant made payments aggregating $363.48 and then
defaulted. Plaintiff sought execution for the unpaid balance of the
original judgment and defendant moved to stay execution. The court
of appeal allowed the execution on grounds that there was no satis-
faction of the accord, stating that section 1524 "has no application to
the circumstances of the present case.
11 4
The result in Blumer is correct; the reasoning is not. This was
a liquidated obligation, determined by the trial court that issued
judgment. Because there was no consideration for the creditor's
agreement to accept less than the full amount, no accord could be
formed under the common law. The creditor's agreement to accept
less was effective only because of section 1524. Applying the statute
to the facts, the creditor agreed in writing to accept part perform-
ance, but the debtor did not fully perform under the new agreement.
110. Id. at 52, 125 P.2d 'at 888.
111. 265 Cal. App. 2d 976, 70 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1968).
112. Sawyer v. Somers Lumber Co., 68 Mont. 169, 177, 282 P. 852, 854 (1929) (apply-
ing what is now MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-1403 (1989)).
113. 128 Cal. App. 22, 16 P.2d 319 (1932).
114. Id. at 26, 16 P.2d at 321.
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Therefore the original obligation was revived. The payments made
were credited as payments on account and the creditor was entitled
to execution for the unpaid balance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Application of the common law principles of accord and satis-
faction has assisted parties in making knowing, deliberate, and expe-
ditious resolution of their unliquidated or disputed obligations. Simi-
larly, application of Civil Code section 1524 has permitted parties to
compromise debts that are both liquidated and undisputed.
The principles of accord and satisfaction were clearly and cor-
rectly applied in the recent case of Thompson v. Williams.11 Plain-
tiff, an attorney, referred a personal injury case to defendant, who
agreed to pay plaintiff one-third of the recovery in the underlying
case. After receiving a fee of $450,000, defendant tendered $90,000
to plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed $150,000, and after negotiation, the
parties settled at $114,000. Plaintiff then sued for the balance alleg-
edly due.
Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court ap-
plied the three elements of accord and satisfaction as found in Potter:
1) that there was a bona fide dispute; 2) that the debtor made it clear
that acceptance of the part payment would fully satisfy the obliga-
tion; and 3) that the creditor understood that acceptance constituted
payment in full. Finding all three elements satisfied, the court
granted summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed.
While the opinion of the court of appeal is a lucid application
of the principles of accord and satisfaction, the court stated, "[t]he
rule of Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. continues to be the law of
this state." 1 6 Ironically, this is not the case. The accord in Thomp-
son was reached in 1984, prior to the effective date of Civil Code
section 1526.
The common law has now been replaced with respect to unliq-
uidated or disputed debts by Civil Code section 1526. Sophisticated
parties will be aware of the statute prior to tendering a conditional
check. The genius of common law accord and satisfaction, however,
has been its availability as a dispute resolution device for the lay
public. Persons accustomed to using the device to settle their disputes
may now find that because of this statute, their attempted settlement
is a snare and delusion. Moreover, because of the ambiguities in its
115. 211 Cal. App. 3d 566, 259 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1989).
116. Id. at 571, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
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language, the statute will invite litigation to determine its meaning.
Appendix: Civil Code section 1526 Rewritten in Enumerated
Form' 1 section 1526
(a) Where:
1. a claim is disputed or unliquidated;
2. a check or draft is tendered by the debtor in settlement
thereof in full discharge of the claim; and
3. the words "payment in full" or other words of similar
meaning are notated on the check or draft, the
acceptance of the check or draft does not constitute an
accord and satisfaction if:
a. the creditor protests against accepting the tender in
full payment by striking out or otherwise deleting
that notation;
b. the acceptance of the check or draft was
inadvertent; or
c. the acceptance of the check or draft was without
knowledge of the notation.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the acceptance of a check or
draft constitutes an accord and satisfaction if:
1. a check or draft is tendered pursuant to a composition
or extension agreement between a debtor and its
creditors;
2. pursuant to that composition or extension agreement,
all creditors of the same class are accorded similar
treatment; and
3. the creditor receives the check or draft with knowledge
of the restriction; or if the check or draft is issued
pursuant to or in conjunction with a release of a claim.
(c) A creditor shall be conclusively presumed to have knowledge
of the restriction if a creditor:
1. has, previous to the receipt of the check or draft,
executed a written consent to a composition or
extension agreement; or
2. has been given, not less than 15 days nor more than 90
117. The purpose of this enumeration is to express more clearly the substance of the
statute. I have resolved the ambiguity discussed at supra text accompanying note 70 by making
the definition of knowledge in section 1526(b) clearly applicable to all creditors.
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days prior to receipt of the check or draft, notice, in
writing, that:
a. a check or draft will be tendered with a restrictive
endorsement; and
b. acceptance and cashing of the check or draft will
constitute an accord and satisfaction.
Mailing the notice by first-class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to
the address shown for the creditor on the debtor's books or such
other address as the creditor may designate in writing constitutes
notice.

